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Abstract This article addresses resilience and vulnerability
as two prominent concepts within disaster risk science. The
authors provide an overview of current uses and benefits of and
challenges to resilience and vulnerability concepts for disaster
risk management (DRM). The article summarizes the evolu-
tion of these concepts and of attempts to define them precisely,
and addresses the potential benefits of conceptual vagueness.
The usage and conception of resilience and vulnerability
within a selection of strategies and legislations in DRM are
compared. Complementing this analysis of disaster risk
research and management practice, a survey identifies some of
the benefits of and challenges to the concepts of resilience and
vulnerability as seen by a peer-community. Synthesizing the
three approaches, we conclude that a certain conceptual and
methodological ‘‘haze’’ prevails, which hampers the transfer
of information and findings within disaster risk science, from
science to practice, and vice versa. But this vagueness offers
opportunities for communication between disaster risk sci-
ence, policy, and practice. Overall, evaluations of the resil-
ience and vulnerability concepts are lacking, which demands
the development of criteria to identify and assess the chal-
lenges to and benefits of resilience and vulnerability for DRM.
Keywords Boundary object  Disaster risk 
Policy–science–practice interaction  Risk
assessment  Resilience  Vulnerability
1 Introduction
The first phase of United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR)’s Hyogo Framework
for Action (UNISDR 2005) will end in 2015, currently
prompting considerations of how to proceed to effectively
reduce disaster losses on a global scale. In retrospective,
after several decades of discussion and application in the
field of disaster risk management (DRM), it is time to
recapitulate the benefits that the resilience and vulnerability
concepts offer for DRM. Until now only a few peer-
reviewed articles have explicitly addressed the question of
benefits and challenges relating to these concepts—that is,
assessed their impacts, usefulness, and usability (Klein
2004; Ford et al. 2013). In many individual studies on
DRM or climate change adaptation (CCA), the benefits of
and challenges to these concepts for DRM are not dis-
cussed. Under the impression of extensive damage and loss
suffered following yet another massive flood in Europe, we
discuss the recent uses, benefits of, and challenges to the
resilience and vulnerability concepts for disaster risk
management.
Since definitions of resilience and vulnerability have
been covered extensively elsewhere (Brand and Jax 2007;
Lewis and Kelman 2010; Zhou et al. 2010; Bara and
Bro¨nnimann 2011; Garschagen 2013; Lorenz 2013), we
cover the variability of definitions only briefly (Sect. 2). In
this article, we use the term ‘‘resilience and vulnerability
concepts’’ to refer to the whole range of resilience and
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vulnerability theories, frameworks, conceptual compo-
nents, methods, and data that are used in DRM, as well as
in disaster risk reduction (DRR) and CCA research and
policy fields. Regarding the potential applications of
resilience and vulnerability concepts, we mainly consider
risk reduction measures, risk management plans and
actions, and climate change adaptation measures in this
article. We use ‘‘benefits’’ as a broad term encompassing
ideas such as usefulness, improvement, or positive impacts.
Under the term ‘‘challenges’’ we address limitations,
problems, abuses, trade-offs, and other related terms. We
understand disasters to be major instances of negative
change, whether acute or gradual; disaster risk reflects the
possibility of negative change; and disaster risk manage-
ment describes the process of dealing with possible nega-
tive changes. We therefore use DRM as an umbrella term
for the agenda used by multiple actors and defined in
various ways. Companies, disaster and emergency author-
ities, media, NGOs, citizens, scientists, and many others
have various capabilities and assets for handling disaster
risks. We conceive DRM as embracing (1) all types of
technological and ‘‘natural’’ hazards and risks, and (2)
all phases of the temporal disaster cycle model (Alexander
2000, p. 3) both before and after disaster, as well as alter-
native conceptions of the disaster cycle (that is, spiral,
evolutionary, and so on).
We approach our research question on the use of resil-
ience and vulnerability concepts for DRM by summarizing
in Sect. 2 how resilience and vulnerability are used as
terms and concepts in disaster risk research. In Sect. 3, we
investigate resilience and vulnerability as a policy field of
DRM at different institutional levels. In Sect. 4, we gather
the opinions of a peer-community of scholars and practi-
tioners regarding the benefits of and challenges to the
resilience and vulnerability concepts. Section 5 provides a
summary of our findings and a discussion, while Sect. 6
offers a conclusion based on that discussion.
2 Resilience and Vulnerability as Umbrella Terms
for Disaster Risk Research
Both resilience and vulnerability are concepts that have
evolved in different disciplines and are applied in different
fields of practice—disaster risk management being one of
these fields. They have been in use for many decades, but
there is no single precise definition of resilience and vul-
nerability. Though the advantages of precisely defined
concepts for intradisciplinary research are evident, con-
ceptual vagueness has some benefits for communication
and for knowledge exchange across disciplinary boundaries
and between the areas of science, policy, and practice.
Building upon this insight, we first provide a summary of
the concepts and attempts to gain precision in defining
resilience and vulnerability, by relying on existing litera-
ture mainly from disaster risk sciences. We then elaborate
the benefits of retaining some vagueness in the resilience
and vulnerability concepts used in the interaction between
science and practice in the field of DRM.
2.1 Attempts to Define Resilience and Vulnerability
Resilience, broadly defined as the capacity to resist and
recover from loss, has developed as a central concept in
disaster risk research in the last decades. The origin of the
concept of resilience as used in disaster risk research is
often attributed to the work of Holling, who applied the
concept to social-ecological systems (Holling 1973).
Nevertheless, the idea of resilience has been used in other
disciplines, for example, psychology, engineering, for
much longer (for the etymology and evolution of the
concept, see Manyena 2006; Zhou et al. 2010; Alexander
2013; Park et al. 2013). Alexander recently traced back the
use of the term resilience from Seneca the Elder, through
Francis Bacon, to its first use in connection with disaster
recovery by Tomes, after the earthquake in the city of Shi-
moda in Japan in 1854 (Alexander 2013, p. 2710). Parallel to
this development, by the end of the nineteenth century the
term resilience began to be used in mechanics and the
evolving science of engineering, where it was connected
with the terms robustness and ductility. Resilience also has
appeared in psychology and medicine, where it was applied
in studies with traumatized children to describe the capa-
bilities of individuals under stress to maintain their psy-
chological integrity and to adapt to circumstances produced
by calamity (see Ho¨fler in this issue). Holling applies the
concept of resilience to ecological systems and in his often-
cited article states that ‘‘resilience determines the resistance
of relationships within a system and is a measure of the
ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables,
driving variables, and parameters, and still persist’’ (Holling
1973, p. 17).
Although this is not the first application of the concept,
Holling’s work catalyzed a rapid growth in use of the term
resilience in different fields of research after 1973 (Park
et al. 2013). Its use expanded from systems ecology to
other fields of research, including disaster risk research.
Park et al. (2013) show that a recent rise of publications in
the field of disaster management may be related to a series
of natural and manmade disasters since the new millen-
nium, which have been conceptualized using the resilience
concept (for example, the Indian Ocean earthquake and
tsunami in 2004, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the
Gulf of Mexico in 2005). After decades of resilience
research and a rising body of literature applying this con-
cept to disaster risk sciences, divergent definitions and
4 Fekete et al. Benefits and Challenges of Resilience and Vulnerability
123
highly varied methodological approaches exist (Zhou et al.
2010). The differences are connected to different episte-
mological approaches, which partly lead to fundamental
conceptual differences and focuses of resilience.
Similarly to resilience, the concept of vulnerability has
been applied to and elaborated in various disciplinary
research domains ranging from hazard and disaster studies
to geophysical sciences, human and political ecology,
economics, and psychology, which has also led to funda-
mental conceptual differences (Miller et al. 2010). During
the last 40 years it has become a core concept in disaster
risk research (Burton et al. 1978; UNDRO 1982; Hewitt
1983, 1997; Watts and Bohle 1993; Blaikie et al. 1994;
Oliver-Smith 1994, 2002; Anderson and Woodrow 1998;
White et al. 2001; Cardona 2004; Wisner et al. 2004).
Nevertheless, there is an ongoing debate on how to char-
acterize vulnerability in both the theory and practice of
disaster risk management (Birkmann 2006; Ionescu et al.
2009). Vulnerability is understood as a concept describing
the differences in the degree of damage incurred from
natural hazards that are manifested for an individual per-
son, for a whole community, a city, or an entire region
(Hufschmidt 2011). The various schools of thought that
have elaborated on the concept of vulnerability focus on
different conceptual elements of this concept, ranging from
the direct outcome of a hazard to the influencing societal
conditions, such as exposure, susceptibility, coping
capacity, power relations, and social capital (Chambers
1989; Chambers and Conway 1992; Bohle et al. 1994;
Wisner et al. 2004). Some scholars see advantage in the use
of the concept of vulnerability in that it helps bridge dif-
ferent disciplinary perspectives and integrates biophysical,
political, economic, and social factors that influence the
degree of damage suffered (Cutter 1996; Mustafa et al.
2011).
Scholarly debates on resilience and vulnerability have
developed independently of each other over decades, but
there are a number of recent works that discuss the two
concepts as interlinked (Cutter et al. 2008; Miller et al.
2010; Menoni et al. 2012). Some conceptualize resilience
and vulnerability as subcomponents of each other (Turner
et al. 2003), while others see one or both concepts as
subcomponents of other umbrella terms, for example, risk
(Cutter et al. 2008; Aven 2011). In the latter case scholars
often subsume former terms such as adaptive capacity or
coping capacity under the concept of resilience.
Regardless of the specific term or school of thought,
recent meta-analyses of resilience and vulnerability con-
cepts and methodologies have shown that there is often
little coherence between the theoretical definitions and the
methodologies applied in empirical studies (Ionescu et al.
2009; Miller et al. 2010; Hinkel 2011). Miller et al. (2010)
not only state that there is a divide between theory and
empirical application of the two concepts, but also
emphasize that there is still a big gap between the ways in
which these terms are understood and applied by aca-
demics, policy-makers, and practitioners. However, they
see a difference between the implementation of the con-
cepts of vulnerability and resilience: although vulnerability
has long been incorporated into practice in disaster risk
communities, there are only a few examples that document
how resilience is explicitly incorporated into practice and
policy.
Despite this conceptual blurriness and the difficulties in
applying resilience and vulnerability, both concepts are
used in disaster risk sciences. The EU-funded research
project ENSURE, for example, has developed a resilience
and vulnerability assessment framework and operational
tool for natural and technical hazards (Menoni et al. 2012).
The aim was to develop context-specific, indicator-based
assessment tools that help the users to identify the strengths
and fragilities of a given territory and community with
respect to extreme natural events.
Park et al. (2013) develop a heuristic framework for a
resilience analysis that is differentiable from, but com-
plementary to, risk analysis for disaster management.
They consider resilience as an outcome of a recursive
process, and apply their framework to river flood man-
agement—without developing a clear methodology for
resilience assessment. These recent examples show that
there are some attempts to make resilience and vulnera-
bility meaningful for disaster risk science and practice.
Nevertheless, the criticism of Klein et al. (2003) still
holds true: Rather than providing a definition and an
explanation of an observable, measurable system attribute,
resilience has become an umbrella concept with some
normative appeal that leads to considerable confusion.
Without an explicit operational definition, resilience has
only a broad meaning, and remains a vague concept rather
than a practical policy or management tool. Literature on
vulnerability has grown and developed to a certain
maturity level at which vulnerability has become a com-
mon evaluation feature of many risk assessments. In
particular, these studies employ semi-quantitative vulner-
ability indices and geospatial assessments, as well as
qualitative surveys and participatory approaches. While
this specific research field and the number of applied
vulnerability assessments are still expanding, the con-
ceptual debates seem far from resolved.
We conclude that although the body of literature on
vulnerability and resilience concepts has grown signifi-
cantly during the last several decades, scholars still struggle
to define the concepts, to relate them to each other, and
place them in the context of disaster risk science. A shared
understanding and definition of the concepts is still
missing.
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2.2 Resilience and Vulnerability as ‘‘Boundary
Objects’’ for Disaster Risk Practice
Both resilience and vulnerability are concepts that appear
in a large body of literature, but the concepts remain,
according to various scholars, ‘‘vague’’ (Strunz 2012),
‘‘metaphoric’’ (Norris et al. 2008), and ‘‘malleable’’ (Brand
and Jax 2007). Nevertheless this vagueness could become
an advantage when putting the concepts into practice in
disaster risk management. Vogel et al. (2007) emphasize
that the multidisciplinary nature of resilience and vulner-
ability research has to face linguistic, paradigmatic, theo-
retical, and methodological tensions. These tensions do not
necessarily have negative impacts on the interaction
between science and practice, but rather facilitate the
coming together of different disciplinary scholars and
practitioners from disaster research. Brand and Jax (2007)
suggest that resilience has become a ‘‘boundary object’’
that facilitates communication across disciplinary borders
by creating shared vocabulary, although the understanding
of the parties may differ regarding their specific interpre-
tation of the term in question. First described by Star and
Griesemer (1989), boundary objects are both plastic
enough to adapt to the local needs and constraints of sev-
eral parties applying them and yet sufficiently robust to
maintain a common identity for those applying them. If the
boundary object remains open to interpretation, it can be
highly useful as a communication tool in order to bridge
scientific disciplines and the gap between scientific
research, policy, and practice. In his argumentation from
the point of view of philosophy of science, Strunz (2012)
concludes that pragmatic and creative problem-solving
may benefit from conceptual vagueness, which allows
blurred conceptual boundaries as well as the use of meta-
phors. Miller et al. (2010) have also argued that resilience
has colloquial and policy appeal for policy-makers and
practitioners as it stresses positive and transformative
processes, while vulnerability, when applied to label
groups and regions, may be associated with a certain
stigma. But as Klein (2009) points out, some (developing)
countries may want to communicate their vulnerability in
order to access adaptation funds.
3 Resilience and Vulnerability in the Policy Field
of Disaster Risk Management
The guiding questions of this section are whether and how
the concepts of resilience and vulnerability are applied in
DRM strategies and policies. A range of examples is selected
to cover legally non-binding and legally binding documents.
Both, in particular legally binding documents, exert influ-
ence and pressure on DRM practice itself. Examples are
provided that range from global through regional to national
scales and focus on the European context.
3.1 UNISDR
Today, the United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) is the focal point for
the United Nations’ policy-making and the coordination of
preventive activities aimed at reducing disaster risks. The
ISDR defines vulnerability as the susceptibility to the
damaging effects of a hazard, and resilience as the ability
to ‘‘resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the
effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner’’.1 The
ISDR, adopted in 1999, succeeds the United Nations’
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (ID-
NDR 1990–1999) (UN 1987). The IDNDR was criticized
due to its initial focus on natural sciences and technology
as ‘‘cures’’ for disasters (Mitchell 1990; Wisner 1993;
Cardona 2004; UNISDR 2004). As the decade proceeded, a
more holistic, people-centered perspective addressing
socioeconomic vulnerability developed.2 The final decla-
ration, the Geneva Mandate on Disaster Reduction adopted
by the IDNDR program forum, is the founding document
for the ISDR and underlines that ‘‘risk management and
disaster reduction [must] become essential elements of
government policies’’ (UN 1999, 16).
Five years later, following the World Disaster Reduction
Conference in Kobe (Hyogo) in 2005, the UN General
Assembly endorsed a 10-year plan, the Hyogo Framework
for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations
and Communities to Disasters (UN 2005). In order to
achieve the overall goal of the Hyogo Framework for
Action (HFA), namely the substantial reduction of disaster
losses, three strategic goals are identified. At this strategic
level the HFA reveals an imbalance between the concepts
of vulnerability and resilience. While reducing vulnera-
bility is one measure amongst others, building resilience is
a strategic goal and ‘‘priority of action’’ itself. The HFA
conceptualizes resilience as an overall desirable, yet by
definition multifaceted and hence somewhat vague, con-
dition. In contrast, vulnerability analysis and assessment
are concrete tools and tasks of DRM,3 which includes risk
analysis and mitigation practices as subsequent steps.
1 http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology, based on the Glos-
sary of 2009. Documents such as the UNISDR’s Hyogo Framework
for Action (UNISDR 2005) and the Mid-Term Review of the HFA
(UNISDR 2010–2011) use a different definition.
2 Release of the Yokohama Strategy, World Conference on Natural
Disaster Reduction 1994, and the strategy A Safer World in the
Twenty-First Century: Risk and Disaster Reduction in 1999.
3 An extension of ‘‘risk management’’ indicating the context of
disasters. http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology, based on the
Glossary of 2009.
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At the UN-level, disaster risk management is regarded
as part of DRR. Yet DRR is defined as a framework with
the ultimate goal of building resilience (UNISDR 2012).
UNISDR campaigns such as Making Cities Resilient: My
city is Getting Ready4 and UNISDR documents, such as
the Mid-Term Review of the HFA (UNISDR 2010–2011),
and in particular the paper on a post-2015 framework
(UNISDR 2012), mirror this conceptualization. What is
more, the Fourth Session of the Global Platform for
Disaster Risk Reduction in 2013 chose the motto ‘‘Resil-
ient People, Resilient Planet’’ promoting in particular the
resilience of communities while vulnerability is not
addressed in certain key summaries (GPDRR 2013a, b).
The implementation of the UN General Assembly’s res-
olutions, such as the ISDR and the HFA, are not legally
binding for the UN member states. It is unclear whether a
legally binding framework for DRR will follow the HFA
(UNISDR 2012). Nevertheless, the ISDR and the HFA put
pressure on national states to enact legislations, an approach
that, according to the UNISDR, is meeting with success.
However, it is difficult to judge the progress since documents
such as the HFA Review 2007–2013 (UNISDR 2013) are
based on voluntary self-assessment by the member states.
In conclusion, the UNISDR conceptualizes resilience as
an overall desirable condition, ultimate goal, and culture.
Hence resilience is located at the top level of the strategic
hierarchy. In contrast, vulnerability analysis, assessment,
and reduction are placed on a lower level since they are
included in a bundle of measures aiming to reach this
ultimate goal of building resilient societies (Table 1).
3.2 European Union
At a regional level, the European Union (EU) approved the
Internal Security Strategy for the European Union in
March 2010 (European Council 2010). Terrorism, crime,
general violence, and ‘‘natural and man-made disasters’’
are identified as major threats to the EU. An EU-wide risk
analysis is envisaged as a basis of cooperation in the field
of civil protection. The action plan adopted in November
2010 sets out more concrete objectives and accordant
actions (EC 2010). One objective is to increase Europe’s
resilience to crisis and disasters with respect to all identi-
fied threats. EU-wide risk assessment and mapping guide-
lines based on a multi-hazard approach and national
approaches to risk analysis and management are identified
as corresponding actions. By 2014, a coherent EU risk
management policy is expected to be established. The EU’s
strategic documents demonstrate that, similar to the UN
objectives, resilience is regarded as the overall aim. Risk
analysis, as an element of risk management, is included as
Table 1 Summary of findings: the usage and conceptualization of resilience and vulnerability in selected legally non-binding and legally
binding documents at the UN, the European, and the national European levels
Strategic goal Vulnerability as






UNISDR/HFA strategy X – X
EU, security strategy X – –b
EU, climate change (CC) strategy X – X
Switzerland, strategy civil protection – – –b
Switzerland, strategy critical infrastructure X – X
Germany, strategy civil protection –a – X
Germany, strategy climate change adaptation – X X
UK, strategy civil protection X – –b
Legally binding
EU, directive critical infrastructure X
EU, directive flooding –b
Switzerland, legislation civil protection –b
Germany, legislation civil protection –b
UK, legislation civil protection –b
a Not explicit, ‘‘self-help’’ as one possible element of resilience
b Not explicit, as part of risk analysis?
4 See for example the list of essentials for making cities resilient, in
particular, the injunction to ‘‘maintain up-to-date data on hazards and
vulnerabilities, prepare risk assessments.’’ http://www.unisdr.org/
campaign/resilientcities/toolkit/essentials.
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a tool to facilitate this aim of a ‘‘resilient Europe.’’ How-
ever, it remains unclear whether vulnerability analysis is
regarded a part of risk analysis and management (Table 1).
In the following, three topics are selected from a range
of key issues that Europe is considered to potentially face
with respect to disaster risk. The first issue, critical infra-
structure, is an example of a perspective that focuses on a
specific object or ‘‘element at risk’’ rather than on a specific
hazard. In comparison, the second example focuses on a
specific hazard and its multiple adverse consequences for
different objects and sectors. As a third example, this
hazard (flood) is then placed in the context of climate
change, which encompasses multiple hazards and multiple
adverse consequences for multiple objects and sectors.
3.2.1 Critical Infrastructure
Within the context of ‘‘natural and man-made disasters’’ the
EU addresses several issues by running special programs
such as the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure
Protection (EPCIP) (EC 2006). EPCIP and its preparatory
Green Paper (EC 2005) provide strategy and policy options
with the overall aim of protecting critical infrastructure. A
complementary directive (EC 2008) transfers European law
into national law and designates the procedure for assessing
the need for critical infrastructure protection. This proce-
dure includes the identification of critical infrastructure and
the performance of risk analysis, that is analysis of threats,
vulnerabilities, and potential impacts. Accordingly, EPCIP
identifies the analysis and assessment of vulnerability as a
necessity within the context of threat and risk analysis and
assessment for critical infrastructure. Reducing vulnerabil-
ity is defined as one work stream of EPCIP, which includes
an analysis of appropriate protection measures. Used as a
guideline, the Green Paper defines the terms ‘‘threat,’’
‘‘vulnerability,’’ and ‘‘risk’’ according to an understanding
in which risk is related to the probability of a potentially
damaging event and its subsequent impact. Developing a
common methodology for risk and vulnerability analysis is
suggested (EC 2008). Implementation of EPCIP guidelines
is optional for the member states. Nevertheless, as sched-
uled via the EU Commission’s directive, member states
must report on risks, threats, and vulnerabilities of critical
infrastructure every 2 years. In the context of critical
infrastructure, resilience is not used in these legally binding
and legally non-binding documents. In comparison, vul-
nerability and the operationalization of vulnerability are
prominent parts of this legislation.
3.2.2 Flooding
Another priority issue addressed on the EU level is flood-
ing. The Directive on the Assessment and Management of
Flood Risks (EC 2007) was adopted in 2007. The EU flood
directive is legally binding and must be implemented in
national legislation. The EU directive defines risk as
resulting from the interplay of the probability of a flood
event occurring and the subsequent damages that may
result. Member states are required to undertake preliminary
flood risk assessments by the end of 2011, prepare flood
hazard and flood risk maps by the end of 2013, and develop
flood risk management plans by the end of 2015, with the
latter including cost-benefit analysis. Neither resilience nor
vulnerability are defined or implemented in this directive
on flood risk management. An analysis of potential adverse
consequences for human health, the environment, cultural
heritage, and the economy is a legal requirement of this
directive. But a differentiation of the degree of potential
damage, and hence a vulnerability analysis, is not explicitly
required.
3.2.3 Climate Change Adaptation
In recent years, the vulnerability and resilience assessment
methodologies in both fields—DRM and CCA—have
increasingly become more integrated (Birkmann et al.
2013). Because the CCA perspective specifically inter-
connects with DRM and is another top priority of the EU,
the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change (EC
2013) is addressed in this section. The goal of the strategy
is to ‘‘contribute to a more climate-resilient Europe’’ (EC
2013, 5). Within the strategy, ‘‘adaptation’’ is the umbrella
term used. A detailed definition of adaptation is not given,
but the adaptation strategy includes a range of measures
such as flood protection structures and ‘‘win–win, low-cost
and no-regret adaptation options’’ such as early warning
systems and sustainable water management (EC 2013, 5).
Though in many respects imprecise, the strategy gives
vulnerability as well as risk analysis a prominent and
clearly defined role. The need for national risk assessment
and management plans is underlined. The development of
indicators for readiness, vulnerability, and adaptation
efforts and the implementation of threat, vulnerability, and
risk assessments are included in the strategy’s action
points. Resilience is not fleshed out in terms of specific
measures. Rather, resilience is regarded as the overall aim
and vaguely described ‘‘climate-resilient’’ products, ser-
vices, investments, and economies are envisaged.
The EU strategy on adaptation to climate change is not
legally binding. Nevertheless, tools and mechanisms for
monitoring and evaluating the member states’ progress are
included in the strategy. The European Commission
regards a legally binding document an option for 2017 in
case progress needs to be reinforced. With respect to the
legally non-binding regional EU strategy and the strategic
CCA perspective, the approach of the UNISDR is echoed:
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resilience is the overall goal at the top level of the strategic
hierarchy. In the context of CCA, vulnerability analysis is
detailed within the methodological framework of risk
management, with the aim of building a ‘‘climate-resilient
Europe.’’ In contrast, resilience does not play a role in the
legally binding EPCIP and flood management directives.
While EPCIP clearly includes consideration of vulnera-
bility, the flood management directive does not incorporate
vulnerability explicitly and remains vague with respect to
assessing risk or the likelihood of ‘‘adverse consequences.’’
So far, resilience is not included in legislation, but is
prominent in strategic planning. The implementation of
vulnerability in legislation differs (Table 1).
3.3 National Civil Protection Strategies
and Legislations
In addition to the UN and EU, three examples of national
strategies and legislative acts are covered in this section.
The selection does not deliver an all-encompassing ana-
lysis of national strategies and legislations in Europe, as
this would exceed the scope of this article. Switzerland,
Germany, and the United Kingdom are chosen as examples
since they show similarities and differences regarding the
application of resilience and vulnerability.
3.3.1 Switzerland
In 2012 Switzerland agreed on a Strategy for Civil Pro-
tection 2015?, which continues to include risk analysis in
the portfolio of future tasks to be undertaken within the
field of civil protection (SFC 2012a). In 2008, a national
risk analysis was mandated to the Swiss Federal Office for
Civil Protection (SFOCP) by the Swiss Federal Council.
Hazards and potential damages based on damage indicators
are analyzed periodically. Based on this analysis, an
account of risks as an expression of the combination of the
likelihood and extent of potential damage within the con-
text of DRM is provided. Switzerland has an almost
20-year history of developing and applying a methodology
for risk analysis (see Guideline KATANOS—Catastrophes
and Emergencies in Switzerland. A Comparative Overview
(SFOCP 1995); Guideline KATARISK—Catastrophes and
Emergencies in Switzerland. A Risk Analysis from the
Perspective of Civil Protection (SFOCP 2003)). Although
the federal legislation—Federal Law on civil protection
(BZG)—does not include the requirement to conduct risk
analyses on the Swiss canton level, 20 of the 26 cantons
have conducted risk analyses within the last 10 years. Of
those, 15 have enacted a political mandate in addition to or
instead of a corresponding law, strengthening the imple-
mentation of risk analysis politically (Bara 2011). The
guideline KATAPLAN (Cantonal Risk Analysis and
Prevention), developed by SFOCP (2013), has assisted the
cantons in conducting their analysis since 2008. KATA-
PLAN starts by identifying threats, developing various
scenarios according to different projected frequencies and
magnitudes of these threats, and estimates their potential
adverse consequences, hence risks. The results of the semi-
quantitative risk analysis are mapped as a coordinate within
a risk matrix. The result of the damage analysis is a specific
damage category adaptable to the cantonal context (for
example, 30–100 casualties, 10–30 km2 of damaged agri-
cultural crop land). In order to define such clearly bounded
damage classes, some degree of vulnerability analysis
needs to be conducted. However, the vulnerability analysis
is implicit rather than explicit and remains vague with
respect to the methods used and the level of detail acquired.
KATAPLAN does not address or implement the concept of
resilience. In comparison, the National Strategy for the
Protection of Critical Infrastructure (SFC 2012b) identifies
resilience as the overall aim and vulnerability analysis as a
tool for reaching this aim.
3.3.2 Germany
In Germany, the New Strategy for the Protection of the
Population, first published in 2002, serves as a guideline
for the advancement of civil protection (GFOCD 2010a).
One of the key elements of the strategy is ‘‘self-help’’5
which is used in the sense of households’ coping and
dealing with crisis. In addition, a key element is agreement
on specific protection targets based on risk analysis. The
strategy follows an all-hazards approach. Of special inter-
est is the federal law on civil protection and disaster
assistance (ZSKG) (GFG 2009a), adopted in 2009. Its main
purpose is to allow for more cooperation and sharing of
resources between the Federation and the federal states.
The ZSKG assigns the duty of promoting ‘‘self-help’’ to the
municipalities/communities. What is more, the ZSKG
instructs the Federation to conduct a nationwide risk ana-
lysis in cooperation with the federal states (GFG 2009a, §
18). The scenario-based, semi-quantitative methodology
includes an estimation of the extent of potential damage
associated with a specific hazard (GOFCD 2010b). The
methodology is largely consistent with the Swiss approach
as described above, but remains equally vague with respect
to how the vulnerability analysis is carried out, and does
not address resilience specifically. As compared to Swit-
zerland, the methodology serves as a guideline and
example for the federal states and municipalities. Below
the national scale, flood risk analysis is compulsory for
those regions potentially affected by floods as designated
by the European Union legislation (Sect. 3.2.2), and is
5 In German, ‘‘Eigenvorsorge,’’‘‘Selbstschutz,’’‘‘Selbsthilfe.’’
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implemented in Germany by the Federal Water Act (GFG
2009b). In addition, federal states include flood risk ana-
lysis and management in their legislation. While vulnera-
bility assessment guidelines exist for critical infrastructures
(GFMI 2011) and community flood risk assessment
(GFOCD 2010c), the application of those methodologies is
optional and not explicitly described within the risk ana-
lysis guideline. Vulnerability reduction is the overall aim
of the legally non-binding German Strategy for Adaptation
to Climate Change (GFG 2008). A method for a federal
vulnerability assessment is under development (Vetter and
Schauser 2013).
There is still a lack of official documents at German
national or regional levels that are using the term resil-
ience, in contrast to countries such as Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Also in certain expertise
areas, resilience is only beginning to be discussed amongst
policy makers and practitioners in Germany.6
3.3.3 The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (UK)’s National Security Strategy was
endorsed in 2010 and emphasizes the challenges faced in an
‘‘age of uncertainty’’ (UKG 2010). The strategy addresses
the growing vulnerability of the country, and its strategic aim
is to build a secure and resilient UK. Resilience is identified
as the overall goal and is defined as the ability to recover
quickly from disturbance, both on the national and local
levels. Informing the public of risks is regarded as critical to
promoting resilience (UKCO 2013). The UK’s rationale
behind promoting resilience is that some risks are regarded
as unpredictable, and that the degree of uncertainty is so high
that these risks cannot be prevented.
The underlying legislation adopted in 2004 is the Civil
Contingencies Act (UKG 2004). This law requires the peri-
odic analysis and assessment of multiple risks in order to plan
for and to advise on risks on the local level. The under-
standing of risk in these requirements is based on an analysis
of the likelihood and the potential damage of different
threats. ‘‘Category 1 responders,’’ that is, councils, emer-
gency services, and appropriate bodies of the health and
transport sectors, are obligated to conduct risk analyses and
assessments based on a multi-hazard approach. The results
are summarized in Community Risk Registers (CRR). CRRs
must be maintained and published on each council’s website.
CRRs describe local hazards over a five-year period in
combination with descriptions of related potential adverse
consequences, such as damage and loss of lives.
Subsequently risks are entered into a risk matrix comparable
to the semi-quantitative Swiss and German methods. The
creation of Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) is intended to
guide and support the communities’ risk analysis and
assessment. On a national level, the governmental and con-
fidential National Risk Assessment (NRA) identifies and
monitors risks for the UK according to an all-hazards
approach. A public version is the National Risk Register
(NRR) (UKCO 2013) that was first published in 2008 and
affirmed by the UK’s National Security Strategy. Compa-
rable to the guidelines of Switzerland and Germany, the
UK’s guidelines on risk analysis and assessment methodol-
ogy are not specific enough to include vulnerability analysis
explicitly in relation to these documents and tasks.
In summary, Switzerland and Germany identify resil-
ience strategically in specific sectors such as critical
infrastructure, but not as part of the overall goal for civil
protection. With respect to legislation, both countries adopt
risk analysis on the federal level with a history of addi-
tional activities in the Swiss cantons. Vulnerability analysis
is not explicitly detailed in the corresponding methodo-
logical guidelines. Resilience is not included in the Swiss
or German legislation. The latter may address resilience by
including ‘‘self-help’’ in the German law (ZSKG). How-
ever, this association is questionable because it may narrow
the conceptual depth of resilience that we find in psy-
chology or social-ecological research. Compared to Swit-
zerland and Germany, the UK incorporates resilience much
more prominently on a strategic level, comparable with the
UN’s HFA, and the EU’s strategy on adaptation to climate
change. The implementation of Local Resilience Forums
illustrates a shift from the national to the local scale,
focusing on communities and individual residents. This
shift is also described as ‘‘third/fourth wave’’ within the
development of the UK’s security (Omand 2013). Risk
analysis and risk assessment are the methodological cor-
nerstones of the UK’s approach to resilience. But compared
to Switzerland and Germany, the national and local levels
are required by law to conduct risk analysis, and to
maintain and publish CRR (Table 1).
4 Peer-Community Survey on Benefits and Challenges
of Resilience and Vulnerability
This section presents the results of a small-scale survey
amongst scientists and practitioners who attended a sym-
posium organized by the ‘‘Katastrophennetzwerk KatNet,’’
a German disaster network (KatNet 2012), which primarily
contains participants from the German-speaking countries.
The intention of the survey was to gather opinions on the
benefits of and challenges to the resilience and vulnera-
bility concepts as another source of opinion with which to
6 Expert Workshop of the Forschungsforum O¨ffentliche Sicherheit,
20–21 February 2013, Berlin on: Resilience—National Perspectives.
http://www.sicherheit-forschung.de/news/13_03_12_ws_resilienz.
html.
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complement our interpretations of scientific literature,
strategies, and policies.
4.1 Survey Design, Intention, and Limitations
The survey was designed to allow quick responses, so as to
avoid discouraging busy symposium participants. The
survey covered nine questions, each with several specific
answers that could be selected with a tick, but also with an
unspecified category—Other (Please specify)—to allow
answers outside those prescribed where necessary. We
used an online survey tool that allowed for anonymity.
Biases of which we are aware include the selection and
specific contextual knowledge of this peer community as a
sample. We also acknowledge limitations in the design of
the questions, for example, those imposed by the use of
shortened, sometimes vague, and predefined answer cate-
gories. Responses to the question about the benefits of
using resilience and vulnerability for DRM were limited
with regard to resilience, which might be due to a lack of
familiarity on the part of survey participants with the
concept. The low response frequency does not necessarily
mean that this concept is less valid to the respondents than
vulnerability. The qualitative responses in the tables are
modified only by correcting obvious typos such as ‘‘diffi-
cult’’; and by capitalizing the first letter in each phrase or
sentence.
4.2 Results and Discussion
Of the 86 participants in the symposium, 38 attendees
responded, the majority currently working as scientists
(27), with five working as practitioners and six in other
professions. Thirty-six respondents have working experi-
ence with vulnerability and 31 with resilience. The high
response ratio of respondents to participants (38:86) is
satisfying, and is probably due to this peer group being
involved in and informed by the joint symposium half a
year before.
4.2.1 Reasons for Adopting the Term Resilience/
Vulnerability
Most respondents gave as their reasons for the adoption of
either resilience or vulnerability (Fig. 1) either science
trend or necessary paradigm shift, followed by policy trend
and new methods. Science trend was given as a reason for
adopting the term resilience more often than it was for
vulnerability. New measures to be implemented was given
as a response more often in relation to vulnerability. Sug-
gestion by a colleague received no responses for vulnera-
bility and marketing received no responses for both
resilience and vulnerability. Under the category other some
respondents offered their own qualitative replies (Table 2;
Fig. 2).
We interpret the responses as being in accord with our
observations that the use of the concept of resilience is still
a rather recent trend in both science and policy in Germany
and its neighboring German-speaking countries. Not
selecting marketing as a reason for the adoption of either
term might reflect the science and non-profit backgrounds
of most participants in the survey. But this could also be
the result of an unclear question category or bad wording in
the study design.
Some of the qualitative replies in Table 2 relate to the
necessary paradigm shift, new methods, and policy trend
answer categories. We interpret the qualitative answers to
also reflect the differences between resilience and vulner-
ability. An important aspect is mentioned by the first quote
(responses in the table appear in alphabetical order); to one
Fig. 1 Survey responses:
reasons to adopt the term
‘‘resilience’’ or ‘‘vulnerability’’
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respondent, resilience means a change in ‘‘risk culture’’
from an emphasis on vulnerability to an emphasis on the
capacity for preparation. In addition, for this respondent the
idea of resilience is more connected to coping with unex-
pected events or processes. There are various usages for
both terms, be they conceptual (including terminology) or
methodological (heuristics or strategic analysis). These
responses anticipated the next question in the survey.
4.2.2 Benefits of Using the Term Resilience/Vulnerability
for Disaster Risk Management
Most respondents see the main benefits of using the term
resilience/vulnerability for DRM as being conceptual/the-
oretical advancement. Methodological advancement is
named more often as a benefit of using the term vulnera-
bility, as are measurability and practical results and
impact.
The responses show that the benefits of both concepts
are largely seen in the conceptual/theoretical advancement
of the field of DRM, closely followed by methodological
advancement, in the case of vulnerability, and practical
results and impact, with vulnerability slightly ahead of
resilience. This might reflect a certain applicability or
significance of impact attributed to both concepts. The low
number of responses citing the measurability of resilience
may echo the uncertainty in our peer community about the
practical feasibility of semiquantitative approaches, some-
times termed ‘‘operationalization,’’ although this is cer-
tainly also a big challenge for vulnerability assessments
(also see Fekete 2012 and the short papers in this issue).
Some of the qualitative responses under the category
‘‘other’’ refer to the ‘‘trend’’ aspect in the previous ques-
tions, but most introduce new aspects not covered in the
pre-defined answer categories. We interpret many
descriptions to indicate typical demands from the policy
and practitioner side; for example, awareness building,
political compatibility, or practice.
Economic efficiency is not mentioned, but ‘‘target ori-
ented’’ could be interpreted as relating to a certain orga-
nizational and strategic type of efficiency and feasibility.
Strategic planning and the system connectivity in the last
comment relate to a long-term perspective and in some
sense to the evaluation criterion of sustainability.
4.2.3 Main Problems and Challenges in Using the Term
Resilience/Vulnerability for Disaster Risk
Management
Most respondents see the definition and the application/
operationalization of both concepts as the main challenges
of using the term resilience/vulnerability for DRM (Fig. 3).
Table 2 Qualitative replies under the category ‘‘other,’’ referring to
the reasons for adopting the term resilience or vulnerability
Question 1: What were the reasons for adopting resilience (if
applicable to you) and not another term?
Change of risk culture: Due to the lack of resources, we stopped
fighting our vulnerability, we started to prepare for the
‘‘unexpected’’
Heuristical value
(Lack of) Resilience was seen as part of our vulnerability
framework
Own [re]search interest
Question 2: What were the reasons for adopting vulnerability (if
applicable to you) and not another term?
Counterpart of resilience
Elaborated concept
Focus on social dimensions of disaster
In order to account for the negative consequence of a natural
disaster
‘‘Policy trend’’ in the sense that vulnerability assessments
became important. Vulnerability is a well established term in
science, engineering, and the DRR/DRM community
Strategic analyses
Fig. 2 Survey responses:
benefits of resilience or
vulnerability for disaster risk
management
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Difficulty in differentiating them from similar terms and
concepts7 and possible misuse are also topics. Unwanted
resilience or vulnerability of certain groups/agents such as
criminals or diseases, and sidelining other concepts or
measures are mentioned to a lesser degree.
We interpret the responses as indicating the continuing
uncertainty about the clarification and definition of termi-
nology, and thus of the challenges inherent in applying
these terms. This is underlined by problems in the differ-
entiation of resilience and vulnerability from similar terms
and is explicitly evident from the high number of responses
citing problems in their application. Overall this may
reflect a certain lack of maturity of both these concepts in
terms of established semantic standards, and may also
suggest uneasiness about their measurability and direct
implementation. The relatively high number of responses
highlighting possible misuse of the concepts is notable.
While other negative challenges, such as unwanted resil-
ience or sidelining other concepts, are not ticked often, the
community seems aware of some underlying critical
aspects. We address the issues around unwanted resilience
in more detail in the discussion section below.
The qualitative replies address challenges in communi-
cating these concepts or in talking about them. We address
these points in detail in the discussion section below.
5 Discussion
We have considered the usage of resilience and vulnera-
bility and hinted at the benefits they offer and the chal-
lenges they face in science, strategies, and legislation. We
have cast a spot-light on the various ideas about these
benefits and challenges within the community of disaster
risk scientists and practitioners. In this section, we sum-
marize and discuss our findings, and also add further
thoughts on resilience and vulnerability in disaster risk
management.
5.1 What is the Status Quo of Resilience
and Vulnerability in Disaster Risk Management?
In the following, our findings based on the scientific liter-
ature, strategies, legislations and the peer-community sur-
vey are summarized and discussed.
5.1.1 Conceptual and Methodological Haziness
The pluralistic character of disaster risk makes the variety
of definitions, conceptions, and methods concerning resil-
ience and vulnerability simultaneously necessary, confus-
ing, and stimulating. The different conceptions of
resilience and vulnerability pose a challenge for disaster
risk science and practice. The literature review demon-
strates that a shared understanding and definition of the two
concepts is still lacking. As the results of the survey sug-
gest (Question 5), such variety is problematic in terms of
both defining the concepts themselves and differentiating
them from similar terms and concepts. This imposes
Fig. 3 Survey responses: main
challenges to the use of
resilience or vulnerability in
disaster risk management
7 In Fig. 3 we have presented the questions from the questionnaire
with exactly the same wording as they had in the questionnaire itself.
In the text beneath Fig. 3, we have quoted the questions as indicated
in italic writing, except for ‘‘Differentiation to similar terms and
concepts,’’ since it was only in the language editing of this manuscript
that it became apparent that in English this formulation is potentially
ambiguous.
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problems in the application and operationalization of
resilience and vulnerability. This situation is less serious in
the case of vulnerability, as reflected by the analysis of the
strategic and legislative documents and the results of our
survey (Questions 2 and 4).
Hence, we see the need and potential for harmonization.
Conceptual and methodological variety and haziness are
intrinsic to disaster risk science and management. Vague-
ness offers benefits for interdisciplinary and science-prac-
tice interaction. The very conceptual variation and
vagueness of vulnerability and, in particular, resilience
may facilitate their use as communicative bridges between
scholars and practitioners from different disciplines in
disaster risk management. Such ‘‘boundary objects’’ facil-
itate communication across disciplinary borders and bridge
the gap between science, policy, and practice. Some have
argued that resilience has colloquial and policy appeal as it
stresses positive and transformative processes. From a
political-strategic perspective, resilience is well established
at the top level of the strategic hierarchy and is identified as
a desirable condition, overall aim, and cultural attribute, as
for example is demonstrated by the UN’s HFA, the EU
strategy for adaptation to climate change, and the UK’s
civil protection strategy.8 Interestingly, the participants in
our survey rated vulnerability as slightly more visible than
resilience with respect to a policy trend. But one respon-
dent affirmed resilience as being politically compatible,
target-oriented, and positively connoted (Question 3).
Since resilience is associated with a positive condition,
from a political-strategic perspective the concept serves to
assemble different stakeholders with different interests
behind one goal: that of reducing the negative impacts of
disasters.
In our view the literature and strategies included here
clearly show that resilience is used as an umbrella term. If
these efforts are channeled towards mobilizing resources
and political will with the overall aim of increasing the
knowledge base about disaster risk, we believe that end
justifies the means. However, we see a danger that the
scientific concept and the conceptual advancement of
resilience suffer from such usage, since resilience is dis-
missed as only a buzzword. Already some experts regard
resilience merely as a fashion, metaphor, analogy, mar-
keting term, or paradigm (Dombrowsky 2013). The
‘‘myth’’ (Kuhlicke 2013), ‘‘catchword,’’ and ‘‘science and
policy trend’’ aspects of resilience meet problems when
theory is put into practice. But use of resilience does
instigate critical discussion and communication about risks,
which we see as beneficial for the advancement of DRM.
5.1.2 Vulnerability and Risk Analysis in Disaster Risk
Management
Although the vulnerability concept is still characterized by
a considerable degree of conceptual variation and haziness,
the literature review and the survey (Questions 2 and 4),
show that compared to resilience the vulnerability concept
is more elaborated and advanced methodologically. This is
mirrored by the usage of vulnerability in strategic docu-
ments in the fields of DRM, DRR, and CCA. Within the
UNISDR framework, in particular in the HFA, vulnera-
bility analysis and assessment are established as risk ana-
lysis tools. This approach is reflected by the EU’s strategy
on adaptation to climate change and the EPCIP, which are
transferred into legislation. Although there is no standard
procedure for analyzing vulnerability, the use of vulnera-
bility is widely accepted and requested. Because risk ana-
lysis also varies methodologically, there is a common
understanding that an estimation of the degree of potential
losses is necessary. This occurs because a hazard of a given
magnitude may have completely different consequences
depending on the vulnerability of the system that is
affected. Consequently, risk analysis is needed to plan
preventive measures and is a precondition for communi-
cating risks. In this context, vulnerability is the key to
analyzing risks and understanding disasters.
5.1.3 Beyond Risk Analysis: Resilience, Vulnerability,
and the Unexpected
How do we prepare for the unexpected? In our highly
interconnected, complex world systemic risks often include
‘‘domino effects’’ (Renn et al. 2007; Renn and Keil 2008,
2009). In such complex systems, the conjunction of (small-
scale) mistakes or failures can lead to a catastrophe (Per-
row 1984). Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) have analyzed high-
reliability organizations that must continue to function
because their failure will result in fatal losses. They suggest
building up resilience, in the sense of increasing these
organizations’ capacities and flexibility, as one means of
disaster prevention. The concept of resilience offers a
perspective that includes the possibility of risks beyond
those that we can identify and analyze with a risk analysis
toolbox. The UK follows this perspective. The pursuit of
resilience is adopted based on the consideration that some
risks are unpredictable and that uncertainty remains an
intrinsic element of society. Hence resilience of commu-
nities is considered beneficial for dealing with impacts yet
not known. This view is also present in our survey (qual-
itative answer to Question 1), supported by a conviction
8 This is also the case for numerous organizations we have not
covered in this article. For example, resilience is also regarded an
‘‘excellent rallying point to connect the different policy communities
working on different types of risks. Resilience as a common goal has
the potential to bring together humanitarians, stabilization and
development actors’’ (OECD 2013, p. 1).
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that resources are scarce, which requires a decision
regarding the channeling of resources to specific ends. We
maintain that the concept of resilience can offer an answer
to the question of how to prepare for the unexpected. But
we also believe that reducing vulnerability also offers real
potential in a resource-constrained world. Reducing vul-
nerability is beneficial when facing the unexpected, since
the degree of damage will be less. In addition, scholars
conceptualize resilience and vulnerability as highly inter-
connected concepts, or even as elements of each other.
From this perspective a divide would not be meaningful.
5.1.4 Transfer of Political Mandates into Practice
Some countries, such as Switzerland and Germany, have
incorporated risk analysis on a national level into their legal
system, and the UK has enacted risk analysis at both the
national and local level. But except for the case of EPCIP,
vulnerability analysis is included implicitly rather than
explicitly in the legislation reviewed in this article. Vague
descriptors such as ‘‘damage assessment’’ or the ‘‘estimation
of adverse consequences’’ are preferred and explicit adap-
tations are not detailed. Legal requirements provide added
impetus to disaster risk management and foster compre-
hensive action. Political will and legislative enforcement are
crucial for stronger disaster prevention, as stated by the
UNISDR. However, legislation tends not to address vul-
nerability explicitly. Corresponding methodological guide-
lines leave much scope for the transfer of concepts into
practice, as illustrated by the EU flood directive: member
states are requested to use the best practice and best tech-
nologies available for their risk maps and risk management
plans, while excessive costs ought to be avoided. In Swit-
zerland, Germany, and the UK vulnerability analysis
remains blurry with respect to methods and data used and
level of detail required. These decisions need to be made by
the practitioners, that is, the disaster risk managers. Con-
sidering the limited financial resources available for the
acquisition of skills, technologies, and data, legislation in
support of DRM will likely continue to leave much room for
interpretation as to whether and how vulnerability analysis
is integrated into DRM. While the reasons for such vague-
ness are understandable, if risk analysis is a legal require-
ment, vulnerability analysis should be clearly addressed, as
it is in EPCIP. It is then vital to provide resources to assist
the integration of vulnerability reduction into the different
scales of disaster risk management.
5.1.5 Transfer of Responsibility to Citizens Mainly
Resilience may be used to justify a hidden transfer of
responsibility from public authorities to citizens. This
argument is exemplified by the UK example, which
strongly promotes local resilience. We identify this issue as
a challenge to working with the resilience concept. Dom-
browsky (2013) observes a loss of the original meaning of
resilience, and the misuse of the term when public
authorities promote the increased ‘‘resilience of commu-
nities’’ and the transfer of responsibility to the citizens
under the banner of ‘‘building resilient communities.’’ He
questions whether this understanding and use of the term is
meaningful in the face of conceivable extreme events, such
as a nuclear disaster or the presence of toxic substances in
our daily food. Dombrowsky would prefer that resilience is
understood as making citizens more critical and resistant to
being exposed to such hazards in the first place.
While this view rightly pinpoints a possible misuse of
the term by public authorities seeking to retreat from
responsibility, the present pressures on civil protection
structures need to be considered. Risk potential is rising.
On the one hand we possibly face a more frequent occur-
rence of extreme events; we live in a highly globalized and
interconnected world that imports and exports risks (for
example, infectious diseases), and we are highly dependent
on critical infrastructures that are tightly interconnected
and exposed. Conversely, we observe a rising shortage of
financial resources, personnel, and volunteers in DRM;
when disaster happens, public authorities will not be able
to prevent losses and disruptions. Building resilience is
indeed an important measure of disaster prevention. This
requires clearly defined concepts and plans for concrete
measures to be implemented. In addition, despite all our
scanning of the risk horizon and the use of think tanks in
the attempt to anticipate the unexpected, it is very likely
that we will miss a range of systemic risks. To build
resilience at all levels entails fostering preparedness in case
the unexpected becomes reality. When considering the
context of the HFA, ‘‘building resilient communities’’ is
crucial in countries where public authorities are weak, are
not trustworthy, or have no resources for DRM. Strength-
ening the local capacity of people under these circum-
stances is vital indeed.
5.2 Where to Go from Here? Discussion of Future
Research Needs
In addition to the results and findings presented so far, in
the following we add some further thoughts on the
requirements for future research concerning the benefits of
and challenges to resilience and vulnerability for disaster
risk management.
5.2.1 Pitfalls of Resilience and Vulnerability
Our discussion of challenges has shown potential problems
associated with a political use, or misuse, of the concept of
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resilience. Widely absent is even an awareness, let alone a
thorough scientific analysis of, the possible pitfalls of the
use of resilience and potential types of what might be
termed ‘‘mal-resilience,’’ in analogy to ‘‘mal-adaptation.’’
For instance, ‘‘bouncing back’’ in the sense of rebuilding
preexisting vulnerable conditions, or by resettlement of
poor people in flood-prone areas, has been extensively
covered (Oliver-Smith 1991; Fernando 2010). Another
aspect of mal-resilience might take the form of hidden
agendas behind the fac¸ade of resilience; a very real pos-
sibility the prospect ‘‘that the ‘myth of resilience’ may
become a powerful worldview that enables actors to define
what is ‘right’ and what is ‘wrong’’’(Kuhlicke 2013, p. 61).
Other potential downsides of the overly positive advocacy
of uncontrolled and self-serving shortsighted development
and innovation are issues that still need to be researched as
potential forms of mal-resilience. Even the way in which
resilience is conceptualized involves trade-offs; for
instance, deciding between proactive and reactive resil-
ience (Frommer 2013). Another challenge to the use of
resilience is the possibility that its use may sidelining
previous approaches such as vulnerability assessment
(Hufschmidt 2011; Deeming 2013). Beyond that, even
unwanted forms of resilience exist, for example persistent
structural systemic conditions such as corruption or mar-
ginalization that are often discussed within social vulner-
ability or community resilience research. Other unwanted
forms of resilience are those displayed by terrorist or
criminal groups or disease-causing microorganisms (Zolli
and Healy 2012). In previous work on vulnerability, we
have identified pitfalls in the methods used to develop
vulnerability indices and obtain data, as well as in the
communication with end users, and the stigmatization and
victimization of the vulnerable (Hufschmidt 2011; Fekete
2012). One of the biggest challenges encountered is trying
to apply and ‘‘operationalize’’ the terminology and theo-
retical concept of vulnerability, which is also reflected by
the replies to Question 5 (Fig. 3). Some of our lessons
learned might be helpful for resilience research and prac-
tice, but it seems that resilience brings another set of
challenges to the table (Tables 3, 4).
5.2.2 Evaluation Criteria for Benefits
Reports, for instance by the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC 2012), provide
detailed information about the general impacts and benefits
of resilience and vulnerability. However, it is difficult to see
how this can be specifically related to DRM or DRR. Within
the context of CCA, Vetter and Schauser (2013) analyze
which criteria would be useful for prioritizing adaptation
measures and opt to include ‘‘acceptance’’ as a criterion.
Gathering evaluation criteria to estimate the benefits of
resilience and vulnerability is the task of an ongoing research
project at the Cologne University of Applied Sciences; the
topic involves an international comparison of the benefits of
critical infrastructure research projects for civil protection
(Project name: KritisFuE). As a preliminary result, evalua-
tion criteria are broad and diverse enough to include acces-
sibility, efficiency (also: effectivity, efficacy), feasibility,
impact, improvement, novelty, relevance (for a certain user-
group or agenda), simplicity, and sustainability. This wide
range of evaluation criteria illustrates how difficult it is to
evaluate any project or theme. The evaluation of resilience
and vulnerability is aggravated by the multifaceted attribu-
tions both concepts have accumulated over the years in dif-
ferent disciplines.
In fact it is difficult to actually depict the effectiveness
of measures for reducing vulnerability and increasing
resilience, which would finally reduce damage and risk.
This is because the comparability of disasters is low; it is
Table 3 Qualitative replies under the category ‘‘other,’’ regarding
the benefits of resilience or vulnerability for disaster risk management
Question 3: What are the main benefits of using the term resilience
for DRM?
To extract the characteristics of the development of
understanding security and one might mark differences in
educational aspects
Awareness building expansion to non-physical topics
Is the new term
Political compatibility; target oriented & positively connotated
To describe certain measures
Question 4: What are the main benefits of using the term
vulnerability for DRM?
To extract the characteristics of the development of
understanding security and one might mark differences in
educational aspects
Awareness building expansion to non-physical topics
For practice: strategic planning
Possibility to connect environment, infrastructure & society
systemically
Table 4 Qualitative replies under the category ‘‘other’’ with regard
to the problems and challenges in the use of resilience or vulnerability
for disaster risk management
Question 5: What are the main problems and challenges of using
the term resilience/vulnerability for DRM?
Difficult to explain to non-scientific project partners
In edu: soldiers mentality; disaster control: it is a view
aggregating elements and relations instead of distinguishing
Interdisciplinary teams require the awareness that there can be
different definitions; Difficulty to find the same ‘‘language’’ or
at least to understand another ‘‘language’’
The duality to efficiency (operational financial concepts) for
political decision-making processes.
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rare that the same type of disastrous event recurs, espe-
cially in the same place, because changes occur in the
overall setting (new buildings, different mix of population,
and so on). One such rare example is the flooding of the
Rhine, which occurred in 1993 and again in 1995. In 1993,
with the Rhine reaching 10.63 m in Cologne, the damage
done amounted to approximately USD 87 million. In 1995,
a flood reaching 10.69 m resulted in total damages of only
USD 37 million; this is less than 50 % of the cost
encountered 2 years previously (Fuchs and Vogt 2013).
Better or more extensive flood protection structures had not
at that time been realized by the city’s public authority.
Rather, this drastic reduction of damage can be attributed
to effective communication and support between the resi-
dents, and between the residents and the City of Cologne’s
Flood Protection Center (FPC Cologne) as the public
authority in charge. Residents and local businesses reflec-
ted on the damage mechanisms and implemented
straightforward measures such as securing buildings and
underground parking areas against floods (Fuchs and Vogt
2013). It is difficult to assign the various measures that
have been realized to strict vulnerability-reducing or
resilience-increasing categories. The main point is that
damage was reduced very effectively through a process of
learning and communication followed by implementation
of suitable measures. While this example illustrates the
monetary benefit of resilience and vulnerability measures,
the implications of resilience and vulnerability need to be
evaluated beyond simple economic indicators, even when
policy makers and the industry may respond more to eco-
nomic evidence, compensation demands, or legal liability.
6 Conclusion
The HFA will come to an end in 2015. Consultations on
how to proceed are currently ongoing. The HFA and the
ISDR promote resilience as an overall goal and a cultural
attribute to which to aspire. We find vulnerability and
vulnerability analysis subordinated to the roles of tools for
DRR, which ultimately aims to ‘‘build resilience.’’ Con-
sidering that vulnerability studies have a much longer tra-
dition in disaster risk science and management, this
development is noteworthy. With vulnerability and resil-
ience currently being discussed on the international policy
agenda, a reflection on the usage, benefits, and challenges
of resilience and vulnerability is timely. Using literature
sources, strategies, and legal documents, supported by a
small survey among a peer group, we have identified some
of the multiple benefits of and challenges to resilience and
vulnerability, aiming to address both concepts equally.
Looking ahead, we see relevance for platforms such as
the HFA in promoting the advancement and improvement
of the concepts of resilience and vulnerability in terms of
their benefits, challenges, possible pitfalls, and misappli-
cations. There remains a need for more in-depth scientific
evaluation studies in this field. While evaluation studies
and criteria for NGOs and project reporting to donor
agencies exist, there is a paucity of evaluation criteria in
scientific papers. We also need a more systematic and rigid
evaluation of the benefits and challenges once measures for
reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience are in
place. Such evaluation would require mid- and long-term
studies with an appropriate level of funding. We see major
potential benefits of both concepts due to their stimulation
of interdisciplinarity that bridges science, policy, and
practice, and due to their potential for improvement in
effectively reducing disaster risks within the practical field
of disaster risk management. This requires considerable
effort, boldness, and closer cooperation between science,
policy, and practice. Finally, we stress the need for a more
reflective and careful use of both terms, in particular of
resilience.
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